


## Secondary use of Healthcare Data

Anonymisation vs. Pseudonymisation



## **GDPR** Cornerstones

AContrario's 10 cornerstones of GDPR compliance





Interplay of **legal**, **ethical**, **organizational** and **technical** obligations and efforts

## Secondary Use of Health Data

General concepts



## Consent vs. Legitimate interest

GDPR Consent vs. Health law Consent



## Secondary Use of Health Data

Compatibility of Purposes (1)

- Article 5.1 (b) GDPR requires personal data to be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes
  - Further processing for scientific research in accordance with article 89.1 GDPR shall not be considered incompatible with the initial purpose and thus requires no new legal ground for processing
    - Article 89.1 GDPR requires appropriate safeguards to be in place in order to ensure respect for the principle of data minimization => Those measures may include GDPR compliant pseudonymization!

## Secondary Use of Health Data

Compatibility of Purposes (2)

- In case the further processing is not covered by article 5.1 (b) GDPR, the purpose of further processing might still be compatible with the initial purpose on the basis of article 6.4 GDPR
  - Once again reference is made to the need for appropriate safeguards, which may include pseudonymization
- When no compatibility can be established on the basis of article 5.1
   (b) or article 6.4 GDPR, a new legal basis will have to be found
  - This might entail that you will have to pass by an ethical committee

## Consent vs. Legitimate Interest

As a legal ground for lawful processing

## In case compatibility test requires new lawful ground for secondary use of health data:

- Health related personal data can only be processed (such as anonymised, shared, etcetera) on the basis of:
  - Art. 6, §1 GDPR + Art. 9, §2 GDPR
- The processing of health related patient data as part of a datavalorisation project, such as secondary use, can be justified on the basis of:
  - the legitimate interests of the data controller (= hospital) (article 6, 1, f); and
  - the necessity for scientific research (article 9, 2, j)

## GDPR Consent vs. Health law Consent


- Consent under health law does not equal consent under the GDPR
  - Likewise, consent under Swiss Data Protection Act is not informed consent under Swiss Human Research Act
- Misconception about informed consent confirmed by the EDPB in its guidelines on the interplay between the GDPR and the CTR
  - Consent in CTR primarily refers to the core ethical requirement to ensure the human dignity and right to integrity => It is not conceived as an instrument for data protection!
- Consent under GDPR must be freely given, specific, informed, unambiguous (and in case of special categories of data explicit) in order to be considered as a valid legal ground for processing
  - This threshold will often not be met in the context of the CTR or HRA

# Charter for secondary use


Data governance model




Role based access to data will not be sufficient to manage access correctly




Role based access to data will not be sufficient to manage access correctly



Role based access to data will not be sufficient to manage access correctly



Role based access to data will not be sufficient to manage access correctly



## Anonymization vs Pseudonymization


What's in a name?



## The 6 truths of Pseudonymisation

GDPR Pseudonymisation is not the same as Anonymisation GDPR Pseudonymisation is a higher standard than pre-GDPR Pseudonymisation GDPR Pseudonymisation is not failed Anonymisation GDPR Pseudonymisation requires protection of more than direct identifiers GDPR Pseudonymisation provides more value than Anonymisation GDPR Pseudonymisation requires dynamism 6

## The EDPB recommends GDPR pseudonymisation



#### **EDPB LAWFUL SCHREMS II USE CASE 2**

#### Transfer Of **Pseudonymised** Data

#### Schrems II Lawful Use Cases

#### **USE CASE 1**

Data Storage For Backup And Other Purposes That Do Not Require Access To Data in the Clear

#### **USE CASE 2**

Transfer Of **Pseudonymised** Data

#### **USE CASE 3**

Encrypted Data Merely Transiting Third Countries

#### **USE CASE 4**

Protected Recipient

#### **USE CASE 5**

Split or Multi-Party Processing

## Schrems II Unlawful Use Cases

#### **USE CASE 6\***

Transfer to Cloud Services Providers or Other Processors Which Require Access to Data in the Clear

#### **USE CASE 7\***

Transfer of Personal Data for Business Purposes Including by Way of Remote Access

and this data is not - or cannot be pseudonymised as described in Use Case 2 or encrypted as described in Use Case 1 because the processing requires accessing data in the clear

https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2021-06/edpb\_recommendations\_202001vo.2.0\_supplementarymeasurestransferstools\_en.pdf

## Privacy Enhancing Techniques (including Tokenization) Fail to Satisfy Statutory Pseudonymisation Requirements

Under the GDPR, the requirements of Article 4(5) fundamentally redefine Pseudonymisation to:

- 1 Dramatically expand the scope to include all Personal Data, vastly more comprehensive than direct identifiers; and
- 2 Dramatically restrict the scope of additional information that is lawfully able to re-attribute personal data to individuals.

'pseudonymisation' means the processing of personal data in such a manner

- that the personal data can no longer be attributed
- o to a specific data subject
- without the use of additional information,







provided that such additional information

- is kept separately and
- is subject to technical and organisational measures
- to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person;

The first (blue) half of the Article 4(5) definition, by itself, means:

- The outcome must be for a dataset and not just a technique applied to individual fields because of the expansive definition of Personal Data (all information that relates to an identified or identifiable individual) as compared to just direct identifiers;
- Additional information could come from anywhere, except the dataset itself; and
- Replacement of direct identifiers with static tokens could suffice.

However, when combined with the second (purple) half of the definition, the requirements regarding additional information mean that any combination of additional information sufficient to re-attribute data to individuals must be under the control of the data controller or an authorized party. To achieve this level of protection, it is necessary to:

- Protect all indirect identifiers as well as direct identifiers; and
- Use dynamism by assigning different pseudonyms at different times for different purposes to avoid unauthorized re-linking via the Mosaic Effect (see <a href="https://MosaicEffect.com/">https://MosaicEffect.com/</a>).

## Statutory Benefits of Statutory Pseudonymisation

**Reduced disclosure obligations/liability** for data breaches
[Articles 32, 33 and 34]



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Compatibility of new (secondary) data processes [GDPR Article 6(4)]

Support for scientific/historical research and statistical processing

to enable: [Article 89(1)]

- Secondary processing, sharing and combining of data by expanding purpose limitation [Article 5(1)(b)]
- Extended permissible storage of data [Article 5(1)(e)]
- Processing of "sensitive" special categories of personal data [Article 9(2)(j)]



Support for Legitimate Interest processing for: [Article 6(1)(f)]

- Greater flexibility in complying with Right to be Forgotten / Right to Erasure requests [Article 17(1)(c)]
- Greater flexibility in complying with Right to Restrict Processing requests [Article 18(1)(d)]
- Exclusion from the **Right to Data Portability** [Article 20(1)]
- Greater flexibility in overcoming **Right to Object to Processing** requests [Article 21(1)]

Statutory Benefits of Pseudonymisation Under GDPR

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Data minimisation, purpose limitation, & data protection by design and by default

[Articles 5(1)(b) & (c), 25(1)]

Data sharing & combining:

[Articles 11(2) & 12(2)]

#### Data Type

Photo

Name

Date of birth

Sex

Address (street)

Address (city)

Reference department

Diabetes Type

Retinopathy

Last glucose reading

## Data As Is



Vanessa Nsomme

2 June 1992

Female

Stationstraat 4

Zonnedorp

Endocrinology

1

Yes

124

#### Variant 1: lightly minimsed

/

Vanessa Nsomme

/

Female

/

Zonnedorp

Endocrinology

1

Yes

110-130

#### Variant 2: further minimised

/

ID\_RE3Kjj33

/

Female

/

Zonnedorp

Unit ID dfjm7

1

Yes

/

#### Variant 3: pseudonymised

/

ID\_345aZJ98

ID 125687

ID ABC13

/

Province of Antwerp

Unit ID dfjm7

Type ID KJMKJ12

Retino ID sfjL91

110-130


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
# GDPR Pseudonymisation Context Specific At Use Protection:


- Purpose Limitation
- Data Minimisation
- Value Maximisation

Only GDPR Pseudonymisationenabled "At Risk" controls limit the AMOUNT of identifying data (Data Minimisation) and the TYPE of data (Purpose Limitation) to enable ALL use cases.



## Using dynamism to defeat re-identification risk via the mosaic effect





Protections and Techniques	Туре	Protects Data In use	Supports Protected Data Sharing and Multi-Cloud Processing	Supports Al and Machine Learning	Reconciles Conflicts Between Protection and Accuracy	Utility Comparable to Cleartext
Cleartext	None	NO				
Cleartext with Access Controls	Security	NO				
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)	Privacy Enhancing Computation	YES	NO			
Multi-Party Computing (MPC)	Privacy Enhancing Computation	YES	YES	NO		
Homomorphic Encryption (HE)	Privacy Enhancing Computation	YES	YES	NO		
Differential Privacy	Privacy Enhancing Computation / Anonymisation	YES	YES	NO		
Cohorts/Clusters	Anonymisation	YES	YES	NO		
Masking	Anonymisation	YES	YES	YES	NO	
K-Anonymity	Anonymisation	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Tokenization	Anonymisation	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Generalization	Anonymisation	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Synthetic Data	Anonymisation / Privacy Enhancing Computation	YES	YES	YES	MIXED <sup>1</sup>	MIXED1
Statutory Pseudonymisation	Privacy Enhancing Computation	YES	YES	YES	YES	MIXED <sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Vendors claim and Buyers believe YES; informed commentary concludes NO.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Buyers assume NO; informed commentary concludes YES.


# Charter for secondary use

Data governance model



## Ecosystem for RWD use & valorisation






Cascador Health - Confidential 24

Example of pseudonymised complex dataset



#### De-Linking & Data Use Minimization:

## Separating Information Value From Identity



★ Enables Dynamic De-Risking and Controlled Relinkability

### Dynamic De-Risking:


## Creation of Privacy Transformers

#### **Embedding protection into the data:**

- 1. Anonymization Techniques
- 2. Field-Level Pseudonymization
- 3. Re-Identification Risk Management

#### **Protecting against:**

- ✓ Inference attacks
- ✓ Linkage attacks
- √ Singling out



#### Policy Automation:

## Privacy Transformer Scales Variant Twin Creation



Privacy Transformer Enforces Policy

RD-97cef37aef9ad9120efc

gender-wr6m

age10-Vf2Q

zip3-d9Bh

lat3-ev8F

long3-dv9S

rel-Udv3



Variant Twin Embodies Policy

Unique Pseudonym	Gender	Age_10	Zip_3	Lat_3	Long_3	Reliability Score
<b>★</b> RD-97cef37aef9ad9120efc	gender-wr6m	age10-Vf2Q	zip3-d9Bh	lat3-ev8F	long3-dv9S	rel-Udv3
RD-c75dd862e63ed8d259b0	gender-wr6m	age10-0z4S	zip3-1cgh	lat3-dv0J	long3-dv2X	rel-Udv3
RD-9c015cba189493b9cac8	gender-wr6m	age10-qPTL	zip3-d9Bh	lat3-ev8F	long3-dv9S	rel-sc6K
RD-80d74c7536e5bc706f8a	gender-OrWg	age10-1fcQ	zip3-uy4c	lat3-iob4	long3-iev5	rel-Udv3
RD-b6ff1a08bf59ecc70f15	gender-OrWg	age10-aMpl	zip3-d9Bh	lat3-5jAn	long3-7eeG	rel-j9dV

Variant Twins enable scalable sharing, combining and enriching of data for Big Data, Al and ML

## Controlled Relinkability:

## Universal Protection & Unrivaled Utility



Variant Twin

Unique Pseudonym	Gender	Age_10	Zip_3	Lat_3	Long_3	Reliability Score	Retention Offer
RD-97cef37aef9ad9120efc	gender-wr6m	age10-Vf2Q	zip3-d9Bh	lat3-ev8F	long3-dv9S	rel-Udv3	Yes
RD-c75dd862e63ed8d259b0	gender-wr6m	age10-0z4S	zip3-1cgh	lat3-dv0J	long3-dv2X	rel-Udv3	No
RD-9c015cba189493b9cac8	gender-wr6m	age10-qPTL	zip3-d9Bh	lat3-ev8F	long3-dv9S	rel-sc6K	No
RD-80d74c7536e5bc706f8a	gender-OrWg	age10-1fcQ	zip3-uy4c	lat3-iob4	long3-iev5	rel-Udv3	Yes
RD-b6ff1a08bf59ecc70f15	gender-OrWg	age10-aMpl	zip3-d9Bh	lat3-5jAn	long3-7eeG	rel-j9dV	Yes



### Master Index Match

Unique Pseudonym	Name	Email	Telephone	SSN	Credit Card #	Gender	Date of Birth	Zip Code	Latitude	Longitude	Reliabilit y Score
RD- 97cef37aef9ad9120efc	Steve	Steve@gmail.com	818-222-9067		Nex	rt hest :	action	= Conta	act Stave		
RD- 80d74c7536e5bc706f8a	Sarah	Sarah@me.com	310-334-7854	-	Next best action = Contact Steve, Sarah and Jessie with offer						
RD- b6ff1a08bf59ecc70f15	Jessie	Jessie@you.com	747-408-3402								29

## About AContrario

<a contrario> lat., adj. or adv. "on the contrary"; contrary, contrarily, in the opposite sense

Focused on commercial, IP, IT and data protection law, AContrario is a premier business law firm offering innovative, specialized and personalized legal advice.

But AContrario is much more than that. It's the law firm reinvented. It's the escape from the ivory tower.

Sure, we can provide top-notch legal advice. We'll represent you in court or work out a settlement agreement for you too. But there is so much more we can do for you.

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#### Your contacts.

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